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2009/5/20 参考消息 <go2group@gmail.com>
China's Prisoner of Conscience
The secret journals of Zhao Ziyang, once China's best hope for political reform, surface in a new book.

 
 

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于 09-5-19 通过 卧草集 作者:北国

China's Prisoner of Conscience

The secret journals of Zhao Ziyang, once China's best hope for political reform, surface in a new book.
Excerpt 1: Tragedy
Page 33-34 (from Part 1: The Tiananmen Massacre, Chapter 4: The Crackdown)
English Transcript
On the night of June 3rd, while sitting in the courtyard with my family, I heard intense gunfire. A tragedy to shock the world had not been averted, and was happening after all.
I prepared the above written material three years after the June Fourth tragedy. Many years have now passed since this tragedy. Of the activists involved in this incident, except for the few who escaped abroad, most were arrested, sentenced, and repeatedly interrogated. The truth must have been determined by now. Certainly the following three questions should have been answered by now.
First, it was determined then that the student movement was “a planned conspiracy” of anti-Party, anti-socialist elements with leadership. So now we must ask, who were these leaders? What was the plan? What was the conspiracy? What evidence exists to support this? It was also said that there were “black hands” within the Party. Then who were they?
Second, it was said that this event was aimed at overthrowing the People’s Republic and the Communist Party. Where is the evidence? I had said at the time that most people were only asking us to correct our flaws, not attempting to overthrow our political system. After so many years, what evidence has been obtained through the interrogations? Have I been proven right, or have they? Many of the democracy activists in exile say that before June Fourth, they had still believed that the Party could improve itself. After June Fourth, however, they saw the Party as hopeless and only then did they take a stand to oppose the Party. During the demonstrations, students raised many slogans and demands, but the problem of inflation was conspicuously missing, though inflation was a hot topic that could easily have resonated with and ignited all of society. If the students had intended on opposing the Communist Party back then, why hadn’t they utilized this sensitive topic? If intent on mobilizing the masses, wouldn’t it have been easier to raise questions like this one? In hindsight, it’s obvious that the reason the students did not raise the issue of inflation was that they knew that this issue was related to the reform program, and if pointedly raised to mobilize the masses, it could have turned out to obstruct the reform process.
Third, can it be proven that the June Fourth movement was “counterrevolutionary turmoil,” as it was designated? The students were orderly. Many reports indicate that on the occasions when the People’s Liberation Army came under attack, in many incidents it was the students who had come to its defense. Large numbers of city residents blocked the PLA from entering the city. Why? Were they intent on overthrowing the republic?
Of course, whenever there are large numbers of people involved, there will always be some tiny minority within the crowd who might want to attack the PLA. It was a chaotic situation. It is perfectly possible that some hooligans took advantage of the situation to make trouble, but how can these actions be attributed to the majority of the citizens and students? By now, the answer to this question should be clear.
Chinese Transcript
6月3日夜,我正同家人在院子裏乘凉,聽到街上有密集的槍聲。一場舉世震驚的悲劇終于未能避免地發生了。
“六四”悲劇三年後,我記下了這些材料,這場悲劇已經過去好多年了。這場風波的積極分子,除少數人逃出國外,大部分人被抓、被判、被反覆審問。情况現在應當是非常清楚了,應該說以下三個問題可以回答了:
第一,當時說學潮是一場有領導、有計劃、有預謀的“反黨反社會主義”的政治鬥爭。現在可以問一下,究竟是什麽人在領導?如何計劃,如何預謀的?有哪些材料能够說明這一點?還說黨內有黑手,黑手是誰呀?
第二,說這場動亂的目的是要顛覆共和國,推翻共産黨,這方面又有什麽材料?我當時就說過,多數人是要我們改正錯誤,而不是要根本上推翻我們的制度。這麽多年過去了,審訊中得到什麽材料?究竟是我說得對還是他們說得對?許多外出的民運分子都說,他們在“六四”前,還是希望黨往好處改變。“六四”以後,黨使他們完全絕望,使他們和黨處在對立的方面。在學潮期間,學生提出過很多口號、要求,但就是沒有提物價問題,而當時物價問題是社會上很大的熱點,是很容易引起共鳴的。學生們要和共産黨作對,這麽敏感的問題他們爲什麽不利用呢?提這樣的問題不是更能動員群衆嗎?學生不提物價問題,可見學生們知道物價問題涉及改革,如果直接提出物價問題動員群衆,實際上要反對、否定改革。可見不是這種情况。
第三,將“六四”定性爲反革命暴亂,能不能站得住脚?學生一直是守秩序的,不少材料說明,在解放軍遭到圍攻時,許多地方反而是學生來保護解放軍。大量市民阻攔解放軍進城,究竟是爲了什麽?是要推翻共和國嗎?當然,那麽多人的行動,總有極少數人混在人群裏面攻打解放軍,但那是一種混亂情况。北京市不少流氓、流竄犯乘機鬧事,那是完全可能的。難道能把這些行爲說成是廣大市民、學生的行爲嗎?這個問題到現在應當很清楚了。
Excerpt 2: Punishment
Pages 189-190 (from Part 4: War in the Politburo, Chapter 2: Zhao Walks the Line)
English Transcript
Another issue was how to deal with people implicated in all of this. The Anti-Liberalization Campaign was not just a theoretical issue. My biggest headaches came from the issues of whether to punish people, how to reduce the harm done to people, and how to contain the circle of people being harmed. From the beginning of the campaign, some Party elders were also very enthusiastic and wanted to punish a lot of people. Deng Xiaoping had always believed that those who proceeded with liberalization within the Party should be severely punished. Wang Zhen and other elders believed this as well. People like Deng Liqun and Hu Qiaomu were even more eager to take the opportunity to destroy certain people and take pleasure in the aftermath.
Under these circumstances, it was difficult to protect certain people, or limit the number being hurt or even to reduce the degree of harm that was done. Hence when it was drafted, the Number Four Document set strict limits on the punishment of those designated by the campaign as having made mistakes. The document defined this as: “Punishments that will be publicized and administrative punishments must first be approved by the Central Committee, and are to be meted out to those few Party members who openly promote bourgeois liberalism, refuse to mend their ways despite repeated admonitions, and have extensive influence.” The document also stated, “For those who hold some mistaken views, criticisms by fellow Party members may be carried out in Party group administrative meetings. They should be allowed to hold to their own views and the method of carrying out the criticism must be calm.”

At the meeting of national Propaganda Department leaders and on other occasions, I also spoke on how to win over the vast majority of people in the theoretical and cultural domains. I suggested we cooperate even with people with biased or false ideas. I pointed out, “Among Party members working in the theoretical and cultural fields, there are those who clearly uphold the Four Cardinal Principles but are a bit conservative and rigid; some are enthusiastic about reform yet have made statements that are inappropriate. We cannot just label the former as dogmatic or the latter as pursuers of liberalization. We should educate and cooperate with them all.”

When proceeding with the Anti-Liberalization Campaign, I had intentionally emphasized that we should classify those who had taken faulty liberal actions as well as those who were too conservative and rigid into the same group of people who were too biased. The purpose was to avoid or reduce the harm being done to people.

Chinese Transcript
以上幾點,就是說明1987年中央領導班子改組、耀邦辭職以後,面臨著一個聲勢浩大的反自由化運動。在這種情况下,不反是不可能的。當時有一種很大的力量,要乘反自由化來大肆批判三中全會的路綫,要否定改革開放政策。而我如何頂住這股勢力,如何把反自由化控制起來。不使擴大化,不涉及經濟領域;儘量縮小範圍,儘量减少一些思想混亂,這是一個方面。再一個方面就是對人的處理的問題。要不要處理人、傷害人。如何少處理人,不過多傷害人,這也是我當時面對最頭痛的問題。

反自由化以來,一些老人們勁頭很大,極左勢力也很大,想要整很多人。鄧小平一向主張對黨內一些搞自由化的人作出嚴肅處理。王震等其他幾位老人也是如此。鄧力群、胡喬木等人更是想乘機把這些人置于死地而後快。在這種情况下,如何在這次反自由化中儘量少傷害一些人,保護一些人,即使沒法避免也力求傷害得輕一些,這是一件比較麻煩的事情。一開始,在制定中央四號文件時,爲了少傷害一些人,對如何處理在反自由化中犯錯誤的人作出了嚴格的規定。文件提出:需要在報刊上點名批判和組織處理的,只是個別公開鼓吹資産階級自由化、屢教不改而影響很大的黨員,並且應經中央批准。還指出,對有些持系統錯誤觀點的人,可以在黨的生活會上進行同志式的批評,允許保留意見,采取和緩的方式。我在宣傳部長會議上和其他場合還講了在思想文化領域要團結絕大多數人的問題,指出包括有這樣或那樣片面錯誤觀點的人都要團結。我還指出,在從事思想理論文化領域工作的黨員中,既鮮明堅持四項基本原則,又熱心改革開放的人固然不少,但也有些人擁護四項基本原則,而有些保守僵化;也有些人熱心改革開放,而講了些過頭的話,出格的話。既不要把前者看成是教條主義,也不要把後者看成是自由化分子,都是要教育團結的人。我當時有意識地强調反自由化時把有點自由化錯誤的人和有點僵化保守的人,都說成屬于認識上的片面性,就是爲了儘量避免或少傷害人。

Excerpt 3: Socialism
Pages 205-206 (from Part 4: War in the Politburo, Chapter 4: Preparing for the Main Event)
English Transcript
Nevertheless, we had practiced socialism for more than thirty years. For those intent on observing orthodox socialist principles, how were we to explain this? One possible explanation was that socialism had been implemented too early and that we needed to retrench and reinitiate democracy. Another was that China had implemented socialism without having first experienced capitalism, and so a dose of capitalism needed to be reintroduced.

Neither argument was entirely unreasonable, but they had the potential of sparking major theoretical debates, which could have led to confusion. And arguments of this kind could never have won political approval. In the worst-case scenario, they could even have caused reform to be killed in its infancy.

While planning for the 13th Party Congress report in the spring of 1987, I spent a lot of time thinking about how to resolve this issue. I came to believe that the expression “initial stage of socialism” was the best approach, and not only because it accepted and cast our decades-long implementation of socialism in a positive light; at the same time, because we were purportedly defined as being in an “initial stage,” we were totally freed from the restrictions of orthodox socialist principles. Therefore, we could step back from our previous position and implement reform policies more appropriate to China.

Chinese Transcript
但是,我們已經實行了三十多年的社會主義,對一直遵循傳統社會主義原則的中國人民,究竟應該給個什麽說法呢?一種說法是,中國社會主義搞早了,該退回去,重搞新民主主義;一種說法是,中國未經資本主義發展就搞社會主義,現在應當進行資本主義補課。這兩種說法雖然不能說沒有道理,但是必然會在理論上引起很大爭論,很可能在思想上造成新的混亂。特別是這樣的提法不可能得到通過,搞得不好會使改革開放事業遭到夭折,因此不能采取。我在1987年春季考慮十三大報告時,很長一個時期就考慮這個問題如何回答。在思考過程中我越來越覺得“社會主義初級階段”這個提法最好。它既承認、肯定了我們已搞了幾十年的社會主義的歷史,同時由于它是個初級階段,完全可以不受所謂傳統社會主義原則的約束;可以大膽地調整超越歷史的生産關係,從越位的地方退回去,實行適合我國社會經濟水平和生産力發展需要的各種改革政策。

Excerpt 4: Economic Reform
Pages 112-113 (from Part 3: The Roots of China’s Economic Boom, Chapter 4: Finding a New Approach)
English Transcript
The reason I had such a deep interest in economic reform and devoted myself to finding ways to undertake this reform was that I was determined to eradicate the malady of China’s economic system at its roots. Without an understanding of the deficiencies of China’s economic system, I could not possibly have had such a strong urge for reform.

Of course, my earliest understanding of how to proceed with reform was shallow and vague. Many of the approaches that I proposed could only ease the symptoms; they could not tackle the fundamental problems.

The most profound realization I had about eradicating deficiencies in China’s economy was that the system had to be transformed into a market economy, and that the problem of property rights had to be resolved. That was arrived at through practical experience, only after a long series of back-and-forths.

But what was the fundamental problem? In the beginning, it wasn’t clear to me. My general sense was only that efficiency had to be improved. After I came to Beijing, my guiding principle on economic policy was not the single-minded pursuit of production figures, nor the pace of economic development, but rather finding a way for the Chinese people to receive concrete returns on their labor. That was my starting point. Growth rates of 2 to 3 percent would have been considered fantastic for advanced capitalist nations, but while our economy grew at a rate of 10 percent, our people’s living standards had not improved.

As for how to define this new path, I did not have any preconceived model or a systematic idea in mind. I started with only the desire to improve economic efficiency. This conviction was very important. The starting point was higher efficiency, and people seeing practical gains. Having this as a goal, a suitable way was eventually found, after much searching. Gradually, we created the right path.

Chinese Transcript
也許有人會問,你過去在地方工作,怎麽對經濟改革發生興趣?我認爲中國經濟必須改革,雖然那時我也看過一些東歐經濟改革的書,但出發點不是爲了改革而改革,主要的是我認爲中國的經濟弊端太多,人民付出的代價太大,效益太差。但弊端的根本在哪里,開始也不是很清楚。總的想法就是要提高效益。來北京後,我對經濟工作的指導思想,明確地不是爲了追求産值多少,也不是要把經濟發展搞得多快,就是要在中國找到一個如何解决人們付出了勞動,而能得到相應的實惠的辦法,這就是我的出發點。資本主義發達國家經濟增長2-3%就不得了了,而我們經常增長10%,但人民生活沒有得到改善。至于怎樣找到一條路子,我當時觀念裏沒有什麽模式,沒有系統的主張。我就是希望經濟效益好,有這一條很重要。出發點就是經濟效益好,人民得到實惠。爲了這個目的,摸索來,摸索去,最後就找到了適合我們的辦法,逐漸走出了一條路。

Excerpt 5: Market Systems
Page 126 (from Part 3: The Roots of China’s Economic Boom, Chapter 7: One Step at a Time)
English Transcript
[Eds. note: Paragraphs in italics were deleted in the editing process.]

In summary, there were two aspects: one was the market economic sector outside of the planning system, and the other was the planned economic sector. While expanding the market sector, we reduced the planned sector. While both planned and market sector existed, it was inevitable that as one grew the other shrank. As the planned sector was reduced and weakened, the market sector expanded and strengthened.

At the time, the major components of the market sector were agriculture, rural products, light industries, textiles, and consumer products. Products involved with the means of production were mostly still controlled by state-owned enterprises.

If the enterprises that controlled the means of production were not weakened or reduced, if a portion was not taken out to feed the market sector, growth could not continue for the emerging market economic sector. If no part of the means of production was allowed to be directly sold on the free market; for example, if small enterprises producing coal or concrete were all under central control; then the new emerging market sector would have run into great difficulties for lack of raw materials and supplies. Therefore, for more than ten years, though there was no fundamental change to the planned economic system and the system of state-owned enterprises, the incremental changes in the transition from planned to market economies had an undeniably positive effect.

Chinese Transcript
總之,當時有兩部分,一個是計劃體制外的市場經濟,一個是計劃體制內的計劃經濟。我們一方面擴大計劃外的市場經濟,另一方面逐步縮小計劃經濟的比重。在計劃經濟和市場經濟並存的情况下,勢必是此消彼長。計劃經濟縮小减弱,市場經濟就得到擴大和加强。當時市場經濟部分主要是農業、農副産品、輕紡工業、消費品工業,而屬于生産資料生産的,基本上掌握在國營企業手裏。一個消費品,一個生産資料,如果控制生産資料生産的企業不削弱、不縮小,不分出一部分投入市場,新生長起來的那一部分市場經濟就無法繼續;如果生産資料生産的那一部分,一點也不允許自銷,一點也不允許進入市場——如果把小煤窑、小水泥也都統管起來的話——那新生長的市場經濟將會因缺乏原材料而遭遇到極大的困難。所以十幾年來對計劃內經濟體制的改革,對國有企業機制的改革,儘管都沒有觸動根本,但從中國由計劃經濟向市場經濟過渡這個意義上看,它起了不可忽視的良好作用。

Excerpt 6: Democracy
Page 270 (from Part 6: How China Must Change, Chapter 5: The Way Forward)
English Transcript

Of course, it is possible that in the future a more advanced political system than parliamentary democracy will emerge. But that is a matter for the future. At present, there is no other.

Based on this, we can say that if a country wishes to modernize, not only should it implement a market economy, it must also adopt a parliamentary democracy as its political system. Otherwise, this nation will not be able to have a market economy that is healthy and modern, nor can it become a modern society with a rule of law. Instead it will run into the situations that have occurred in so many developing countries, including China: commercialization of power, rampant corruption, a society polarized between rich and poor.

Chinese Transcript

當然將來哪一天也許會出現比議會民主制更好、更高級的政治制度,但那是將來的事情,現在還沒有。基于這一點就可以說,一個國家要實現現代化,不僅要實行市場經濟,發展現代的文明,還必須實行議會民主制這種政治制度。不然的話,這個國家就不可能使它的市場經濟成爲健康的、現代化的市場經濟;也不可能實現現代的法治社會。就會象許多發展中國家,包括中國出現權力市場化,社會腐敗成風,社會兩極分化嚴重的情况。


Excerpt 7: Foreigners

Page 107 (from Part 3: Roots of China’s Economic Reform, Chapter 3: Opening Painfully to the World)
English Transcript
In hindsight, it was not easy for China to carry out the Reform and Open-Door Policy. Whenever there were issues involving relationships with foreigners, people were fearful, and there were many accusations made against reformers: people were afraid of being exploited, having our sovereignty undermined, or suffering an insult to our nation.

I pointed out that when foreigners invest money in China, they fear that China’s policies might change. But what do we have to fear?

Chinese Transcript
現在回想起來,中國實行改革開放實在不容易,阻力很大,顧慮很多,很多無名恐懼,給要做這些事的人帶了很多帽子。改革開放,尤其是開放很不容易。一涉及到與外國人的關係,總怕喪權辱國,怕自己吃虧,說“肥水不流外人田”。所以我常給他們講這個道理:外國人到中國投資,他們本來就很多顧慮,我們的政策這樣不穩定,應該說有很多風險,要怕的應該是拿錢進來的外商,我們中國政府有什麽可怕的呢?

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